gold news

 If silver does that, our projection is you could see silver this year $300 to $500 an ounce. Okay? Now, much of that should occur within the first couple quarters of that spread breakout, meaning much of it should occur by middle of this year in a thunderbolt tantrum move. Uh, but silver is going to beat the pants off of gold. Silver is very depressed to gold. We all know that. It's been depressed for a long time. So, that hasn't worked. uh when we're focused on silver and gold the key


level to watch is the bond market because we know this time around not like 2000202 which is.com bubble okay fine simple explain overdone sector or mortgages 2007 through9 you know this family that family a lot of mortgages okay this time it's a government bonds they're the the Titanics of the world ours the Japanese bonds UK you you name But they're all in dire straits and we know that and it's not because of just what's happening now. It's been what's building up and building up and building


up. Okay? And now suddenly because of the events of the terror versus, you know, the war between us and NATO and Europe and so forth, uh it's put our they want to dump everything. You could precipitate a panic where you don't just get a price drop, but you get like a real quick couple day. Oh my no crash type fear. Okay, you can't have that in the bond market. It's bigger than the it'll stock market doesn't compare to the debond market. And it's not just us. It's Japan. We know that. And I I know


that the Fed will intervene because already in November Williams, the head of the New York Fed, announced or in a press conference stated that the U that the Fed was going to quote start buying bonds. Why? He said, "Oh, just because liquidity in the market needed more liquidity." Okay, they can't rally, but they also don't go down. [music] The stress emerging in the Treasury market represents a breakdown in the implicit contract that has governed global finance for decades. US


government bonds have functioned not merely as debt instruments but as collateral reserve assets and the anchor of risk-free pricing across the world. When confidence in that anchor weakens, the effects cascade outward. Leverage becomes unstable. Hedging fails and volatility rises across asset classes. This is why even small incremental moves in long-dated yields can trigger disproportionate reactions. Markets are not reacting to price alone. They are reacting to the erosion of trust in the system that price supports. As this


trust erodess, policymakers face an impossible trade-off, allow yields to rise and risk systemic deleveraging or intervene aggressively and confirm that currency debasement is the chosen path. In practice, authorities almost always choose intervention. Yield suppression, balance sheet expansion, regulatory adjustments, and emergency facilities are not signs of strength. They are acknowledgments that the system cannot tolerate true market clearing. Each intervention buys time, but at the cost of further undermining the credibility


of fiat money. Over time, this dynamic pushes capital toward assets that exist outside the financial system rather than within it. Gold has historically been the first recipient of that capital because it is widely recognized, highly liquid, and officially held by central banks themselves. Silver, however, occupies a unique and increasingly important position. It straddles two worlds. It is both a monetary metal and a critical industrial input. This dual role tightens supply in ways gold does not experience, particularly as


electrification, renewable energy, and technological demand accelerate. Unlike gold, where most of what has ever been mined still exists above ground, silver is consumed, dispersed, and effectively lost. That structural difference matters enormously once investment demand returns. The long-term suppression of silver prices distorted both investor perception and supply incentives. For decades, low prices discouraged exploration and limited primary silver production, while the market relied heavily on byproduct mining from base


metals. This created a fragile supply structure that appears stable during periods of weak demand, but becomes dangerously tight when demand surges. When monetary stress coincides with industrial necessity, the result is not a smooth adjustment. It is a scramble. Prices rise not because of speculation alone, but because there is simply not enough readily available metal to meet competing demands. At the portfolio level, this creates a profound dilemma. The traditional 60/40 stock bond model depends on bonds acting as both income


generators and shock absorbers. When bonds themselves become a source of risk, that framework collapses. Investors are then forced to rethink diversification, not in terms of asset labels, but in terms of underlying exposure, paper claims versus real assets. This is the environment in which precious metals regain, not as trades, but as financial insurance. Silver's smaller market size amplifies this effect. Relatively modest capital flows can drive outsized price moves once sentiment shifts. Psychologically, these


transitions are always uncomfortable. Early phases are marked by disbelief and dismissal, followed by sharp rallies that are written off as anomalies. Midway through, volatility intensifies as markets test conviction, producing sudden corrections that shake out weak hands. Only later does broad recognition set in, at which point prices often overshoot any level that once seemed reasonable. The historical record shows that commodities emerging from long periods of suppression rarely stop at fair value. They move to excess before


stabilizing at a new equilibrium. What ultimately defines this cycle is not price targets, but narrative reversal. Assets that were ignored, ridiculed, or viewed as obsolete suddenly become essential. Meanwhile, assets long assumed to be safe reveal hidden fragility. The ongoing tension in the bond market suggests that such a reversal is already underway. If that tension escalates into a loss of control where intervention becomes constant rather than episodic, the repricing of monetary metals, particularly silver,


will not be optional or gradual. It will be a function of necessity, reflecting a deeper shift away from leverage, promises, and confidence-based assets toward those rooted in physical reality and scarcity. It's got a lot of catching up to do. And also on that percentage basis, you know, ounce of silver, an ounce of gold, it's it's off the page cheap. And what if silver again not only took out its 50-year highs on price and went nuts and get went to a new reality? Why shouldn't those spreads go up and


challenge or maybe take out those highs? 6 and a half%. 1980 to 3.1% 2011 we're at 2%. And if gold is 8,000 bucks only 8,000 bucks a normal eightfold move and silver goes to 3% or goes to 6 12 it's off the page, you know. So that's what we're looking at. And it's not going to be incremental arm wrestling. It's going to be sudden. If there is an asset on the planet that is overly cheap in relation to anything else, including the metals they get out of the ground, it's


the gold and silver miners. They are [snorts] free compared to their historic valuations to an ounce of gold. And when we examine the technicals of let's say you the XAU index which is the gold and silver miners index been around since the 1980s. >> Do like, share, comment and subscribe to this channel. Also, don't forget to hit the bell icon for more updates.


Post a Comment

Previous Post Next Post